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The paper defines a concept of general equilibrium in markets with un-
certainty about prices, and proves the existence of such an equilibrium under
standard conditions on endowments and preferences. In the market equilibrium
defined here the state space which represents price uncertainty is endogenous
to the economy. Agents do not know the possible equilibrium prices a priori.
Theorem 2 establishes the existence of an equilibrium, consisting of a state
space, the corresponding asset markets, and prices yielding a fully insured and
Pareto efficient allocation which clears all markets.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 An Economy with Price Risks 7
3 An Arrow-Debreu economy cannot hedge its price risks 10
4 Layers of Uncertainty and the Russell Paradox 10
5 An Economy with Endogenous Uncertainty 12
5.1 The economy L 14
5.2 The structure of uncertainty in L 14
5.3 The financial markets of L 15
5.4 The household 16
5.5 The price system 17
5.6 An equilibrium of the economy L 18
6 Existence of an equilibrium with full price insurance 19
'Hospitality and research support from the Universita di Siena and the Stanford Institute for
Theoretical Economics during the summers of 1991 and 1992 is gratefully appreciated, as are the
comments of Frank Hahn, Geoffrey Heal, Mordecai Kurz and Ho-Mou Wu
1 Introduction
The contribution of this piece is to offer a new concept of general equilibrium in
markets with uncertainty about prices, and to prove the existence of such an equi-
librium under standard conditions on endowments and preferences. The framework
introduced here is close to the Arrow-Debreu model in that it has several agents and
markets, traders act competitively, and all contracts are entered simultaneously. How-
ever, it expands the Arrow-Debreu theory to allow the state space of the economy and
its financial structure to be endogenously defined at an equilibrium. In other words,
we define an equilibrium economy within a family of economies with different state
spaces each, these state spaces describing the possible price risks. Each economy in
the family has the asset markets needed to hedge against its price risks. The proof of
existence of a general equilibrium establishes the existence of a state space and the
corresponding financial markets, as well as the existence of equilibrium prices and
allocations for those markets. The market equilibrium allocation clears all markets,
is fully insured at the equilibrium prices, and is Pareto efficient.
To motivate the problem of price uncertainty we study it first in the context of
an Arrow-Debreu economy with several price equilibria. This is done in order to
exhibit the limitations of this framework in the context of endogenous uncertainty.
The second part of the paper defines an alternative model of markets with price
uncertainty and proves the existence of a fully insured market equilibrium.
Consider an Arrow-Debreu economy facing several states of nature, with a com-
plete set of asset markets to hedge nature's moves. The economy is regular, i.e. it has
finitely many competitive equilibria, Debreu [7]. In a departure from the standard
framework, the households anticipate that there may be several possible market clear-
ing prices between which a random selection will be made. Uncertainty about prices
makes the market incomplete: in addition to the states of nature, households are now
concerned about new states described by the different market clearing prices. These
states differ from Arrow-Debreu states in that they are endogenous to the functioning
of the economy, while the states typically used in the Arrow-Debreu theory describe
the values of variables which are exogenous to the economy, such as the weather.
If new assets are introduced to complete the market, the new augmented economy
may still exhibit endogenous price uncertainty, because there may be several market
clearing prices for the new assets. This problem may reiterate, leading to a sequence
of economies with an increasing number of asset markets, and gradually increasing
state spaces. A first question is whether this process converges within an Arrow-
Debreu framework. It is shown in Proposition 1 that it does not: the Arrow-Debreu
framework does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of endogenous price
uncertainty. The Arrow-Debreu economy cannot hedge against its own price risks.
With this motivation, we define and study the existence of a market equilibrium
within an extended class of economies, which modifies and extends the Arrow-Debreu
formulation to allow the state space to be endogenously defined as a part of the equi-
Hbrium of the economy. The economy has prices risks in that the agents anticipate
that there may be several price equilibria, and price contingent assets are introduced
to deal with this price risk. The agents may or may not anticipate the Arrow-Debreu
prices. We prove the existence of a state space, asset markets and a vector of prices
for the original markets and for the new asset markets, at which all markets clear and
full insurance is achieved against all risks, including price risks. This covers the risks
of the original economy, plus the price risks of all the newly introduced assets. Trade
occurs in all markets simultaneously, but certain limitations are imposed on trades,
which are similar to margins requirements, for the trading in the newly introduced
assets.
The problem of price uncertainty was introduced and analyzed recently in two
independent and simultaneous pieces, which offer two distinct solutions both quite
different from what is offered here: Hahn [8] and Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2],
and was elaborated further in Chichilnisky, Hahn and Heal [5]. Hahn [8] defines
a two-period economy with incomplete markets for price risks. The agents alter
their behavior when they learn about the several possible equilibrium prices, but
have no more assets to hedge this uncertainty, so the market remains incomplete.
Chichilnisky, Hahn and Heal [5] prove the existence of an equilibrium with incomplete
markets for price risks. In a different approach to the same problem, Chichilnisky,
Dutta and Heal [2] construct a sequence of different, progressively larger economies
in which new derivative securities are introduced at each stage, and show that this
process leads in a finite number of steps to a new economy, the original augmented
by markets for derivative securities, which has unique market clearing prices, and
hence no price risks. Their analysis differs from ours in a number of ways. The first
difference is that they consider a sequence of Arrow-Debreu economies, each having
different endowments and utilities from the previous one, and at each step contracting
takes place before the next economy is known. Instead, in this paper there is only
one economy, and all contracting takes place simultaneously. The economy in this
paper has one utility function and one endowment vector for each trader. The agents
in Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2] anticipate correctly at each stage all the possible
Walrasian equilibrium prices, an assumption which we do not make in our definition of
the economy with endogenous uncertainty in Section 5, nor in the proof of existence
of a market equilibrium, Theorem 2. Moreover, the concept of a market clearing
equilibrium proposed here is different from that of an Arrow-Debreu economy in that
we require "margins", or covered trading on the newly introduced markets. Finally,
in contrast to Hahn [8], Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2] and Chichilnisky, Hahn and
Heal [5], the optimal behavior of the agents with respect to the introduction of new
states of price uncertainty follows a Nash specification: agents choose their trading
strategies so as to maximize utility, taking as given the behavior of others in the
newly introduced markets.
An unusual feature of the type of uncertainty contemplated here is that it depends
on the behavior of the agents as well as on acts of nature. In this sense the economy
has endogenous uncertainty, a concept introduced by Kurz [13], who argued that this
is the predominant form of economic uncertainty, and defined a research agenda and
a framework of analysis that has many points in common with this paper. Kurz [14]
has recently developed his original formulation of endogenous uncertainty in a differ-
ent direction, looking at the structure of rational beliefs. A recent paper by Kurz [15]
advances the research agenda in a general equilibrium model with endogenous uncer-
tainty. The concept of endogenous uncertainty were also discussed earlier in Hahn
[10] and in Dasgupta and Heal [6]. The first results on existence and characteriza-
tion of markets with endogenous uncertainty in a general equilibrium framework were
obtained in Chichilnisky and Wu [4], Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2], Chichilnisky,
Heal, Streufert and Swinkels [3], and Chichilnisky, Hahn and Heal [5]. Within a
three-period model, Henrotte [12] has examined the role of options to hedge price
uncertainty in securities markets.
It seems useful to examine how our formulation of households' expectations about
prices alters the predicted market behavior.. Consider for example an Arrow-Debreu
economy. Following a standard Walrasian approach, an auctioneer announces a vector
of prices, and individuals choose asset holdings and consumption levels to maximize
utility at those prices. This corresponds to individuals having single valued expecta-
tions about prices and leads to Pareto efficient allocations.
The microeconomics of the problem is altered substantially when households antic-
ipate - an auctioneer announces - that one of several possible market clearing prices
will be chosen at random, so that expectations about prices are here multi-valued
rather than single-valued. The individuals' optimization problems are altered: rather
than choosing asset holdings to maximize utility at the equilibrium prices announced
by the auctioneer, they choose so as to maximize expected utility, where the expecta-
tion is over a set of several possible market clearing prices. The old market clearing
prices can no longer clear the markets: they only do so when individuals' choices hedge
solely nature's moves. The new market clearing prices reflect more sophisticated be-
havior: the expected utility being maximized includes expectations about prices as
well as about states of nature. The optimization problem solved by the agents is dif-
ferent, and therefore so are the solutions. In an equilibrium (Chichilnisky, Hahn and
Heal [5]) all adds up: markets clear and the asset holdings chosen are optimal with
respect to the anticipated set of prices. Hahn [8] and Chichilnisky, Hahn and Heal
[5] argue that correct anticipation of the Walrasian equilibrium prices is inconsistent
with the new equilibrium. This tallies with the results of Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal
[2] and of Chichilnisky, Heal, Streufert and Swinkels [3] which argue inter-alia that
the correct anticipation of several market prices is inconsistent with an equilibrium
having a price within this set.
As noted in Hahn [8] and Chichilnisky, Heal and Hahn [5] a problem arises when
households attempt to reach efficient allocations by introducing new assets to hedge
against price uncertainty. In an Arrow-Debreu economy with several possible price
equilibria it is not possible to obtain Pareto efficient allocations by adding extra
assets to hedge price uncertainty. As shown in Section 3, Arrow-Debreu markets with
price uncertainty and with correct expectations are by their own nature incomplete
(Theorem 3, [5]).
The aim of this paper is to investigate in what sense the structure of an Arrow-
Debreu economy is responsible for this failure, and to suggest an alternative structure
of uncertainty and the corresponding financial markets for the achievement of Pareto
efficient allocations and full insurance against price risks.
The Arrow-Debreu structure of uncertainty is simple and powerful: all uncertainty
is expressed by states of nature which are independent of the functioning of the
economy and of each other. All markets operate simultaneously. This framework
deals very well with the uncertainty posed by acts of nature, or exogenous uncertainty.
So well, in fact, that the economy is subsumed into another without any uncertainty
but with more product differentiation: commodities in different states are treated
simply as different commodities. Uncertainty all but disappears.
Matters are quite different with endogenous uncertainty. The difference arises
from the fact that asking a market to hedge against its prices is asking it to hedge
against self-inflicted risks. The economy is asked to hedge against the risks which
it generates. The parallel between this and the Russell paradox in formal logic is
developed in the third section. Here it suffices to recall a well known illustration of
that paradox in which one asks whether a barber, who shaves those who do not shave
themselves, shaves himself. The question has only inconsistent answers: yes leads to
no and no to yes.
When considering uncertainty about prices, one is asking a question with a similar
flavor: whether or not the market can hedge against itself. We can phrase the question
so that it matches the barber's example of the Russell paradox: "Consider an Arrow-
Debreu economy having all the markets needed to hedge risks. Does this economy
hedge its own price risks?" This question can only lead to inconsistent answers.
As shown in Section 3, yes leads to the economy having no price uncertainty, the
economy therefore hedges no price risks. No leads to another contradiction: there are
then uncovered risks, which by definition the market does hedge. In sum: there can
be no Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with the property that its markets hedge against all
risks.
Since the standard Arrow-Debreu market structure cannot hedge price risks, one
is led to question what other type of market structure will hedge the risks derived
from prices as well as from acts of nature. Our answer is in Section 4, describing an
economy with layers of uncertainty. The answer parallels that given to the Russell
Paradox: markets must be structured into layers, each layer hedging the uncertainty
produced by previous ones. The uncertainty produced at one layer is only resolved
in the next. No layer can fully insure its own price risk.
We propose a layered financial market structure having assets of Y different types.
The portfolios available consist of assets of Y different types. Each asset type y =
l , , , y allows the transfer of wealth among all the states within one layer, y. A
resolution of price uncertainty is a market clearing price for each market in each layer.
The first layer represents uncertainty about the market clearing prices of commodities;
the second layer represents uncertainty about the prices in markets which trade goods
(or securities) contingent on equilibrium price vectors. Dependence on a commodity
price vector can be interpreted as dependence on a price index1. Thus the second
layer represents uncertainty about a price index for commodities. The y -f lth layer
deals with uncertainty about the prices of markets in the yth layer.
These layers are a formalization of index-based securities markets, which are
widely traded today. They provide a conceptual explanation of the role of deriva-
tive securities and of their market organization. The states in the first layer are all
the market clearing prices for commodities, the states in the second layer are all the
market clearing prices for index-based securities, the states in the third layer are mar-
ket clearing prices in markets which trade contingent on the prices of the indexes,
and so forth.
Theorem 2 in Section 6 shows that there exists a structure of uncertainty, namely
a number of different derivatives securities, and a set of possible prices for the assets
of each layer, at which traders who maximize their expected utility subject to bud-
get constraints reach fully price-insured positions, and all markets clear. It is worth
recalling that, in a departure from standard practice, the financial structure is en-
dogenously defined as part of the equilibrium. An institutional interpretation of this
is a market auctioneer who reads out a financial structure: the layers of uncertainty,
the number of states in each and the prices in each state. Households then read their
trading plans, making use of the available assets to hedge risks. The auctioneer will
not allow trading until a financial structure has been found where all markets clear
and all traders are fully insured against price risks. We prove that such a financial
structure exists, and that the resulting outcome is Pareto efficient.
The layered market structure that we propose is quite different from that of the
Arrow-Debreu economy. This is not surprising, since we know that Arrow-Debreu
market structures do not hedge price risks. Our market structure has some elements
in common with "compound lotteries", in the sense that rather than trading con-
tingent on a single state, traders trade contingent on a string of realized states, one
realized state per layer of uncertainty. However, the similarity ends here. Although
each realization of the compound lottery could be considered a state, traders can-
not shift income freely across all strings as they would in an Arrow-Debreu market
with compound lotteries. For, if they did, we would be back to the Russell paradox.
Households can only choose plans which are within their budget given the financial
structure of our layered economy. They make ex-ante plans, plans contingent on all
possible sets of equilibrium prices in each layer of uncertainty, plans which depend, of
course, on the financial assets available. Our portfolios are made of assets which allow
the transfer of wealth across states each in the same layer. The financial markets in
1Theorem 2 of Chichilnisky Dutta and Heal (2) establishes the equivalence of dependence on a
price vector and a price index.
our economy are thus incomplete.
As an example, the households in our layered economy hedge commodity price
risks with securities contingent on price indexes. They do so knowing that one of
several commodity prices will occur. This is as it should be: in order to hedge
households must know the risks they face. But their contracts are traded before the
uncertainty about prices is resolved, namely before the actual commodity prices are
realized. This is also as it should be: once they know the actual prices, there is no
room for hedging.
As opposed to the Walrasian auctioneer, our auctioneer never announces a string
of prices, namely one price for commodities, one for securities contingent on indexes,
etc. It cannot do so, for such an announcement would collapse the whole string of
markets into one. The point is rather obvious, and a practical example for this is
provided in Section 4. The auctioneer only announces the set of all possible market
clearing prices in each market layer. The expectations about prices are therefore not
single-valued as in the Walrasian economy; they are multi-valued. Not only they are
multi-valued: they are also multi-layered.
Theorem 2 proves that a regular Walrasian economy can be endowed with a layered
financial structure leading to market clearing allocations which fully insure price risks
and are Pareto efficient. It may seem paradoxical that an Arrow-Debreu economy with
complete markets cannot hedge price risks, while the incomplete market structure
which we propose hedges all risks, including price risks, and leads to Pareto efficient
allocations. But this serves to underscore how different is the behavior of markets
which face risks about economic variables, from that of those facing risks which stem
from nature's moves.
2 An Economy with Price Risks
Consider a standard Arrow-Debreu E economy with / commodities, H households
indicated by h, and S "Savage states of nature". By "Savage states" we understand
descriptions of the environment which are acts of nature and independent of the
actions of the agents, that is, what one usually means by "state". Let R = {^..^5}
denote the S x B matrix of returns on the economy's assets which pay contingent on
the Savage states. We assume that there is a complete set of assets to hedge against
the acts of nature: B = S and rank(R) = S.
Equivalently, we assume
Assumption 1 (Savage Completeness): There is a complete set of contingent Arrow-
Debreu markets.
The initial endowment for each household h is denoted wh G RlxS; the economy's
endowment w = J2k=i wh- Let p £ Rl+S denote a price vector. If ED(p) denotes the
excess demand function of the economy then we let
h=i
We assume that this correspondence is not empty. We shall say that there is price
uncertainty if E(w) is not a singleton. Next we need:
Assumption 2: For an open set U C RlxS of initial endowments iw, the correspon-
dence E(w) has a finite number of elements.
This assumption is not very restrictive if the economy is taken to be regular
[7], because under these conditions the number of competitive equilibria is a locally
constant function of initial endowments, see e.g. Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2].
Let n(w) be the number of distinct elements (vectors) in E(w), and define
n = Maxu n(w)
and N = (t : i = l...n}. Following Hahn [8] one may think of i as the number assigned
to one of n auctioneers. Each auctioneer controls one of the market clearing prices.
Price uncertainty can then be interpreted as uncertainty about which auctioneer is
in charge of calling prices. It is not assumed that different auctioneers always call
different prices.
Assumption 3: For any w there are at least n(w) auctioneers who call different price
vectors, p.
To study price uncertainty arising from multiple equilibria in an Arrow-Debreu
framework, we now enlarge the state space to £ which is S x N so that
The agents have "correct" price expectations reflecting the price which they expect
for a Savage state s when the ith auctioneer is in charge of calling market-clearing
prices. They are formalized by:
Assumption 4- Each individual has a probability distribution v over the event that
the ith auctioneer will be in charge of calling prices, represented by a vector in
Ft" with its components summing to 1. This implies that, given endowments w,
the corresponding probability distribution over second period prices is supported
on the set E(w).
Let p* £ R+ be the S vector (p(l,t)...p(S,t)), that is the vector of Savage state
prices when the ith. auctioneer calls prices. Then the agent's budget set is given by
»
M
 - «*) = 0}
•ssl
The individuals' utilities in the Walrasian economy E with uncertainty over states
of nature are state separable:
Vh(xh) = Esuh(xh(s)). . (1)
Assumption 5: Individual utilities Vhare continuous, strictly quasi-concave and sat-
isfy a standard boundary condition assuring that the norm of the aggregate excess
demand vector increases beyond any bound when one or more prices go to zero.
We now define the utilities of the households in the new economy with uncertainty
about prices as well as with respect to acts of nature. Their expected utility takes
into consideration that there is a set of N states of price uncertainty, and 5 possible
states of nature for each:
Wh((xhi)N) = ENVhi(xhi). (2)
where Vhi(xhi) = Esuh(xhi(s)) for all i in N.
The expected utility over the set N is taken over the probability 77 satisfying
Assumption 4. This expected utility formulation makes it clear that the agent only
cares what his/her trades are in the various Savage-states, although consumption
in each of the n states of price uncertainty is weighted differently according to the
households' price expectations.
Since we work with regular economies, we assume sufficient smoothness. A func-
tion is considered smooth if it is at least twice continuously differentiable:
Assumption 6: The aggregate excess demand function of the economy E is well
defined and smooth for all initial endowments and prices.
This smoothness assumption restricts somewhat the households' utilities as well
as the diversity in households' expectations.
Assumption 7: All households have the same expectations about prices.
3 An Arrow-Debreu economy cannot hedge its
price risks
Consider now the economy E where the households trade additional assets to hedge
against price uncertainty. Can we obtain an Arrow-Debreu, and therefore Pareto
efficient, equilibrium by adding as many assets as needed to hedge against price
uncertainty? The answer was provided in Hahn [8] and in Chichilnisky, Hahn and
Heal [5], Lemma 1. In the following we briefly recall their arguments. The economy
E faces n states of price uncertainty, those in the set iV, and S Savage-states, making
for a space £ = N x S of states of both types. Assume now that the economy has a
complete set of Arrow securities, i.e. one for each element of £ , so that, with perfect
price foresight, the allocations should be equivalent to those of an Arrow-Debreu
economy with state contingent trading. This new economy is called C.
Proposition 1 (Hahn [8]): The complete Arrow-Debreu economy C satisfying as-
sumptions 1 to 7 in Section 2 has no equilibrium; Pareto efficient allocations cannot
be attained by adding extra assets to hedge against price uncertainty.
Proof. At a Pareto efficient allocation, each household must consume the same
Savage-state dependent allocation across all states in the set iV, i.e. xhai = xhai for
each h and all s, and for any two price states i , j = l...n. This is because at each
of the states s 6 5, and all i 6 N, the total endowments of society are the same
and all households attach the same probability to the event that one given auctioneer
chooses the equilibrium prices. Optimal allocation of risk bearing requires that each
household allocation be the same across states in N for each state s G S. Since for
each s £ S the household consumptions across all states in the set N are the same, it
follows that for each state s G 5 the price vectors dependent on the set of states iV,
are all the same. But this implies that all market clearing prices are equal, so that
there is no price uncertainty in the model, a contradiction. Since the contradiction
arises from assuming that all price uncertainty can be hedged by a complete set of
Arrow-Debreu price contingent markets, we have completed the proof.*
4 Layers of Uncertainty and the Russell Paradox
We saw that an Arrow-Debreu economy cannot hedge price risks fully. Any attempt
to complete the market and reach Pareto efficient allocations fails. The failure can
be viewed as the inability of the Arrow-Debreu economy to hedge against the price
risks that it generates.
A practical example will illustrate this failure and suggest an alternative market
structure to hedge price risks. Consider a market in which oranges are traded forward.
Assume that there are three possible market clearing prices for oranges, with the same
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probability each, and that this is common knowledge. In practice, to hedge against
such price uncertainty, options on orange prices are introduced. This is how markets
hedge against price uncertainty in concrete cases.
How are the market clearing prices determined? In an Arrow-Debreu economy
all the market clearing prices are determined by the auctioneer simultaneously for all
states of nature. When attempting to extend this procedure to our economy with
price uncertainty a problem arises. An auctioneer cannot determine simultaneously
the market clearing prices in the market for oranges and those for options on orange
prices. This is because once the auctioneer announces any forward prices for oranges,
there is no hedging role for the options on orange prices. If, for example, the forward
price for oranges announced by the auctioneer is $2, then nobody will buy a call for
oranges at a strike price $x if x > 2, and nobody will sell such a call if x < 2 unless
paid at least the difference $2 — x. At a strike price of $2 the value of this option will
be exactly zero. In other words: options on commodity prices do not have any role
in allocation of price risks if they are traded simultaneously with forward commodity
markets. However, simultaneous trading across all states of uncertainty is required in
an Arrow-Debreu economy. This is the reason why an Arrow-Debreu economy cannot
fully hedge price risks.
In practice, of course, these markets are never traded together: the forward mar-
ket for oranges is typically traded at a date posterior to that at which the option
market closes, so that the price of oranges is still unknown when the option is traded.
In other words, there is a natural "ordering" in the markets for assets to hedge price
uncertainty which cannot be formulated within the Arrow-Debreu treatment of un-
certainty, where all markets are simultaneous. The ordering reflects the fact that the
markets for those assets whose values depend on the prices of other assets, will not
improve risk allocation if the values of those underlying assets are revealed simulta-
neously. The uncertainty must be revealed in an orderly fashion for these markets to
work together. There are "veils" of uncertainty which must be resolved in the proper
order. In our example, first the auctioneer must determine the price for the options
contingent on all the possible prices for oranges tomorrow, and compute the corre-
sponding aggregate demand for options. Only when market clearing prices have been
found is the price for the underlying asset, forward oranges, realized. This argument
leads to a nested sequence of ordered assets, and to orderly resolution of uncertainty.
This is what we call here layers of price uncertainty, a treatment of uncertainty which
is fundamentally different from that in the Arrow-Debreu economy. Of course, all
uncertainty in the Arrow-Debreu economy derives from acts of nature, a type of un-
certainty for which simultaneous contingent markets suffice to attain Pareto efficient
allocations.
How then are assets to hedge price uncertainty to be traded ? Rather than being
contingent on several simultaneous states as in the Arrow-Debreu model, the assets
are now defined in terms of nested risks, or layers of uncertainty. Each layer consist of
a set of states which represent uncertainty of the same type, for example uncertainty
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about all possible equilibrium prices for securities of a given type. All states within a
layer are grouped together, and the uncertainty about a given layer is resolved by the
assets of the following layer. We develop this concept formally in the next section.
To situate the problem within standard grounds and fix ideas, it may be useful
to draw an analogy between the problem of hedging endogenous uncertainty and the
structure of the well-known Russell paradox. The solution to Russell's paradox led
to the development of set theory as it is known today, Halmos [11]. The paradox
arises inter-alia when we inquire whether a set is an element of itself, and can be
illustrated as follows. A town has a barber who shaves all those who do not shave
themselves. The question is: does the barber shave himself? There exists no answer
to this question: yes leads to no, and no to yes.
The solution to the paradox is to structure the universe into appropriate layers or
logical "classes" . When this is done, the question of whether a set belongs to itself is
shown to be ill defined, so that it cannot be answered. Some objects are points and
others are sets: only points can belong to sets, while sets can only belong to higher
level objects, called classes. The question about the barber is ill-posed because a set
cannot belong or cease to belong to other sets such as itself. Our informal language
allows us to pose ill-defined questions.
An analogy between our problem and the Russell paradox can be drawn as follows.
When trying to hedge against price uncertainty within an Arrow-Debreu economy in
which all markets are traded simultaneously, one is attempting to obtain from the
markets of this economy a hedge against the price risks that these markets generate
themselves. As we saw in the Introduction and in Proposition 1 there is no logical
solution to this problem: our economic language allows us to pose an ill defined
- question. Developing further the analogy with the Russell paradox, a solution could be
provided by structuring the problem in logical "classes" or layers. We must structure
uncertainty into layers, each layer designed to resolve the uncertainty created by
previous ones, without ever attempting to go outside the logical order and ask any
one layer to hedge against its own price risks.
5 An Economy with Endogenous Uncertainty
This section formalizes an economy in which uncertainty takes the form of a set
of nested or layered states. In this economy we prove the existence of a general
equilibrium in which all markets clear, where individuals maximize expected utility
within the corresponding budgets, and where at an equilibrium all individuals are
fully insured against price risks (Theorem 2). The results emphasize the difference
between exogenous and endogenous uncertainty. Here full insurance against price
risks is achieved in a market which is not complete, in the sense that wealth is not
, transferable across all states in all layers. If all such transfers were available, this
would be tantamount to a model with simultaneous markets, which as we already
pointed out, does not provide an adequate treatment for price risks. Indeed, if all
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such transfers were available, we saw in Section 3 that the market would have no
equilibrium.
The only wealth transfers available here are between the states which are within
the same uncertainty "layer". At an equilibrium the securities in all "layers" are
actively traded, in the sense that at an equilibrium the net trades of a household in
each type of security are typically not zero. Therefore the layers cannot be considered
redundant, nor can they be discarded after an equilibrium has been achieved.
Theorem 2 in Section 6 proves that although the market is incomplete, in the
sense that it is not possible to transfer wealth among all states, it nevertheless allows
full insurance against price risks and the attainment of Pareto efficient allocations.
This feature contrasts with the case of exogenous uncertainty, where the inability to
transfer income across certain states leads typically to Pareto inefficiency.
We shall consider an economy identical to that defined in Section 2, except for
the structure of price uncertainty, which is defined differently in the next section.
The intention is to obtain, within one single economy with layers of uncertainty, a
result similar to that which has been obtained recently for a sequence of economies.
Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2] constructed an economy to with progressively larger
financial sectors are added and the endowments of the traders consistently modified,
and showed that full price insurance is achieved at the end of this process. To achieve
this they start from a Walrasian economy with several equilibria. Agents are then
informed of all the possible Walrasian equilibrium prices of this first economy. The
corresponding Walrasian equilibrium allocations are used as the endowments of a
second economy, the endowments consisting of price contingent goods traded in price
contingent markets where agents may now hedge against the price uncertainty of the
first economy. The second step is to inform agents that this second economy has in
turn several price equilibria. Using the Walrasian allocations of the second economy
as initial endowments of a third economy, the agents are then allowed to trade so as
to hedge against price uncertainty in the second economy. Each new economy can
be viewed as an enlargement of the first economy expanded to add new commodities,
new endowments and new financial instruments. The procedure continues until an
economy is reached in which there is no price uncertainty, which means that an
economy with a unique Walrasian equilibrium is reached. Chichilnisky, Dutta and
Heal [2] prove that, under regularity assumptions, such an economy can be reached
in a finite number of steps.
This section shows that it is possible to obtain similar results working within one
single economy where households face a set of possible prices for each state of each
layer, and where each household solves a single optimization problem. In other words,
by changing the structure of the uncertainty in our Section 2 economy, we obtain an
economy where the households can achieve full insurance against price risks. These
results require several layers of uncertainty, which are defined endogenously as part of
the equilibrium concept. Each layer represents a different risk and leads to a different
type of security to hedge price risks.
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5.1 The economy L
The economy L is defined as follows. It has H households denoted h = I...H, and /
commodities. There are S states of nature or "Savage states". Each household h has
an initial endowment vector wh G Rl*s of commodities contingent on states of nature.
For the Savage states we have a complete set of assets, as required in Assumption
1. Each agent h has a preference over commodities contingent on Savage states Vh,
as defined in (1). Commodities contingent on Savage states are indicated by vectors
x G RlxS; when it is clear from the context we shall also refer to these vectors as
commodities.
The economy L is therefore defined by its / commodities, S Savage states of
nature, H households and their endowments and utilities:
L = {X = rf+,a = l . . .S> / l € Bf*s9Vh : X -> R, h = 1..JI}
In addition to the Savage states there will be states of price uncertainty in L, deriving
from the fact that different auctioneers will choose the market clearing prices. The
actual market structure of Z, namely what types of assets will be traded and how, will
be determined endogenously as part of the market equilibrium solution. The following
subsection will determine the possible structures of uncertainty among which the
equilibrium structure of L must be chosen.
5.2 The structure of uncertainty in L
A structure of uncertainty of L is defined by a finite set Y indexed by y — 1...Y, a fam-
ily of finite sets Jy , and by probabilities for the elements j y of each set Jy. The letter
Y denotes a set of Y layers of price uncertainty, each layer indicated y — 1...Y. Layer
y = 1 represents uncertainty about the prices of the I x S commodities, its states are
j 1 = 1...J1; they list all the possible market clearing prices in the commodity markets
at the various Savage states. Layer y = 2 has J2 states representing uncertainty
about the prices of the markets in layer 2 : these are I x S price indexes, namely
contracts which are traded contingent on the prices of the / x S initial commodities.
For any z < Y, layer z represents uncertainty about the prices of / x S price indexes
of type 2, which are traded contingent on the prices of the price indexes of type z — 1.
Households will trade ex-ante contracts in the Y market layers, contingent on each
of the j y states in layer y. As this is a real economy without money, the payment for
these contracts is always in terms of / x S vectors of commodities.
As already indicated, for each layer y G V, each state represents a possible market
clearing price for the y — th layer market. For example, in level 1 there are J1 possible
Arrow-Debreu market clearing prices for the 1 x 5 commodities, at level 2 there are
J 2 possible prices for type 2 price indexes which pay contingent on the prices of the
I x S commodities. As an example, in the first two layers there are a total of J 1 x J2
possible equilibrium price combinations.
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We shall now define the random variables describing our economy's uncertainty.
A realization of a random variable is called a resolution of price uncertainty. It is
a vector consisting of Y states, one state from each of the Y markets layers. It is
intended to represent a realization of one market clearing price for each of the Y
layer. A resolution of price uncertainty is therefore a realized path of states and is
represented by a Y dimensional vector ( j 1 . . . j r) , where Vy = 1...Y, j y G Jy. The
probability of the j y state occurring within the set of states in the y — th layer is
TTjy, with YliLi Kj* = 1- The set $ of resolutions of price uncertainty has therefore
cardinality
9> = nYt=1j', (3)
and each realized path {jx...jY) G $ occurs with a probability XJI...JY = TTJI X 7^ 2 x
... x TTJY. Figure 1 represents a realized path and its associated probability:
Figure 1
Summarizing all the above:
Definition: A structure of uncertainty for the economy L is a list
{Y,jy,y = l...Y,*i9 : £ > , - , = 1, j y = l...Jy}
where the finite set Y represents the layers of uncertainty, each finite set Jy
represents the states in layer y, and TTJ» is the probability of state j y within the
y — th layer. A resolution of price uncertainty is a vector (y1...yr), j y € Jy.The
cardinality of the set of resolutions of price uncertainty is $ = H%=1JZ.
5.3 The financial markets of L
We turn now to the financial structure of the economy L. A y—asset is an instrument
which allows the transfer of wealth among the states of the y — th layer of uncertainty.
Formally:
Definition: An elementary y—asset is a vector (l...A\..O) 6 RJy which pays k units
of a numeraire in state j y G Jy in exchange for 1 unit of the numeraire in state
j 1 G Jy, and 0 in all other states. A portfolio of y—assets is a linear combination
of elementary y—assets, a vector Qi" =(#i...0jy) G RJy representing a transfer
of wealth among the Jy states of the y — th layer of uncertainty.
Assumption 8: For each layer y = 1...Y there exists a complete set of y assets, i.e.
there are Jy — 1 distinct elementary y—assets for all y = 1...Y.
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Figure 1
In the example illustrated below the resolution of price uncertainty path (jl...jY)
is marked with empty circles. The uncertainty structure is described as follows.
There are four layers of uncertainty, Y = 4. The number of states in each of the
four layers is
J1 =2, J2 = 2, J3 = 2, J 4 = 3
To simplify the illustration we assumed that there are two equilibria in several
of the layers, even though regular economies satisfying our assumptions will
typically have an odd number of equilibria. The resolution of price uncertainty
illustrated is the path
with probability
*ji..jY = (l/2).(l/2).(l/2).(l/3) = 1/24
I Z
Assumption: We shall assume that each household h = 1...H owns initially no
assets in any state of price uncertainty, so that V/i, h's portfolio of y—assets
0hjV satisfies
X = 0 Vy = 1...K (4)
Definition: A portfolio 0 is an ex-ante hedging strategy for the entire price uncer-
tainty of the economy: it has Y layers, 0 = ([01] •••[#*'])> eac^ layer [0y] consisting
of Jy different portfolios of (y — I)—assets which hedge the price uncertainty of
the previous layer, y — 1 :
0 = ([fl1]...^]) s.t. Vy = 1...K [0y] = (0i\..0Jy),
with &y = (0J...0J,..,) G If'^j* = l..Jv (5)
and for each y, Yli=i 0? = 0*
The hedging role of the portfolio 0 can be explained intuitively as follows. For
each y = 1...Y the y — th layer of the portfolio, [0y], consists of one wealth transfer
vector in RJV~ for each of the Jy states in layer y, indicating that there are Jy ways
of insuring against the Jy~x states of price uncertainty in layer y — l,as defined above.
Each Jy~l —dimensional vector 0*y defines a (jy — 1) asset, i.e. a transfer of wealth
across the Jy~1 states of layer y — 1 uncertainty. This indicates that the uncertainty
introduced by the (y — \)th layer is not hedged at this layer, but rather at the next,
the yth. Furthermore, as discussed above, the (y — \)th layer of uncertainty is hedged
in Jy different ways, indicating that the hedging of the (y — l)th layer of uncertainty
has introduced in turn a new layer of uncertainty. This new layer y has Jy new states,
each representing the possible market clearing prices of the yth level markets.
A portfolio 0 provides an ex-ante investment plan for all possible resolutions
of uncertainty (jx...jY) G $. Therefore, at each realized path of price uncertainty
0"1—iy) G $, 0 defines a portfolio path indicated
where 03-v-i G R is the realized value of the portfolio 0 at the realized state j y in layer
y-
5.4 The household
We turn now to the households' behavior. A plan xh for the h household consists
of an ex-ante contract for each possible resolution of price uncertainty delivering an
I x S vector at each state of each market layer. Therefore a trading plan is a vector
x G i2* x / x 5 , $ defined as in 3. For each resolution of price uncertainty C/1...jy) G $,
the trading plan xh of household h defines a path ofY net trade vectors in RlxS, one
vector in RlxS for each state j y in each layer y, denoted
xh/ -1 :Y\ _ / ^ _ wh xh^ _ ^ ^ xhY _xhy \ £ pYxlxS
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to indicate the net additions to the initial endowment of the household wh along the
realized path (j1...^). The trade at the 0 layer (y = 0) is by definition XJO = wh.
5.5 The price system
An ex-ante price system for the economy L is a vector p 6 i2*x/x5, listing the set of
all market equilibrium prices at each layer of uncertainty. For each resolution of price
uncertainty (i1...jr) € $, p defines a realized price path p{jl.~jY) = (p* --.p^ ) €
When price uncertainty is resolved and a path (j1...^) is realized, all the net
trades in that path xh(j1...jY) are realized. The total consumption vector of the
household after each resolution of uncertainty is therefore the sum of the initial en-
dowment wh plus all the subsequent net trades in xh(jl...jY), adding up to a total
consumption vector xh-Y:
2=0
Consequently, the utility level household h with plan xh along the realized path
(j1...jY) is the utility of the sum of all the net trade vectors along it plus the initial
endowment:
where the utility function Vh is as defined in (1). We may now define the utility
functions of households in the economy L. The utility derived by household h from
the ex-ante trading plan xh is the expected utility of consumption of xh over all
possible resolutions of uncertainty, namely over all paths (jl...jY) € $, each path
considered with its probability, flji...jv:
Uh(xh) = E*Vh(xh(j\..jY)). (7)
We now define the budget set of household h.
Definition: For each prices system p and portfolio $h, a budget set for the h household
is the set of all ex-ante trading plans xh which the household can afford at all
resolutions of price uncertainty.
B{p,Bh) = {xhs.t. V(;1...jy) 6 $,
xh{j\..jY) = ( ^ - wh,x)2 - x)u...,x)Y - x^)
satisfies ££=i
 Pji .(*£ - wh) = 0, W
and
 Pi,.(aJf - xj,.t) = 0f+1 Vy = I...Y}.
This means for at any resolution of price uncertainty (jl...jY), household h may
add a net trade vector (x^ — xh-y^) G RlxS to her/his endowment at the realized state
7y, provided its value computed at jy prices pjy does not exceed that of the agent's
portfolio at that state, 0hy_x.
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5.6 An equilibrium of the economy L
We may now define an equilibrium for the economy L. In addition to the usual
variables describing an equilibrium, namely prices, trading levels, our equilibrium
concept includes an endogenous determination of the layers of price uncertainty. The
structure of price uncertainty is defined as in (5.2) by Y layers of uncertainty with Jy
states in each layer, and the corresponding set oiy — th assets for all layers y = 1...Y.
Together with the structure of price uncertainty, an equilibrium of L consists of a price
vector p* and, for each household h, a trading plan xA*, and a portfolio 6h*, such that
the consumption plan xh* maximizes the utility Uh(xh) over all consumption plans
within the budget set B(p*, 6hm), given the plans of the other households, xh'h^hl ^ h,
all markets clear, and all households are fully insured against price risks.
We shall now describe a possible institutional structure within which such an
equilibrium may come about. As in the Arrow-Debreu economy we rely on the actions
of an auctioneer, except that our auctioneer has a larger role than theirs.
Assumption 9: The auctioneer announces the structure of price uncertainty in the
second period, namely the number of layers of uncertainty Y, of states in each
jv, y = I...Y, and the probabilities TTjy of each state j y in Jy.
For each such announcement, the auctioneer also provides an ex-ante price sys-
tem p (E R**l*s for the economy L. Using this information the households, in turn,
announce their portfolios 6h and their ex-ante plans xh E R*xlxS within their bud-
get sets B(p,6h). The auctioneer then reads the household plans; if an equilibrium
obtains, trading is allowed. Otherwise the auctioneer tries again with another uncer-
tainty structure and correspondingly new prices.
Full insurance for price risks is formally defined as follows:
Definition: The households h = I...H are fully insured against price risks at their
consumption plans {xh}, h = 1...H, when V/i, their total consumption, and there-
fore their utility levels U(xh) defined in (7) are the same at any realization of
the layers of price uncertainty: V (jl...jY), (jl'--jY>) € $
Z = l 2 = 1
Assumption 10: The auctioneer's role is to ensure that no trading takes place until
all markets for commodities and for assets clear, and all households are fully
insured against all price risks.
This seems like a tall order for an auctioneer to fulfill: the next section shows that
it is indeed possible.
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6 Existence of an equilibrium with full price in-
surance
Definition: The array {Y*,J*, xh*,6h*,pm for y = 1...Y* and h = 1...H} is an
equilibrium with full insurance against price uncertainty if for each household
h, the consumption plan xh* maximizes the expected utility 7
Uh(xh) (10)
over the budget set B{p*, 6h*) given the consumption plans xh> of all other house-
holds Whf 7^  h, each household h is fully insured against price risks, at each res-
olution of price uncertainty (ji...jy) € $ all asset markets to hedge price risks
clear:
O £ - i = 0,Vy = l...y, where 0**)J = 0 (11)
and all commodity markets clear at each state of every layer of uncertainty:
H
*£ " *£-i) = 0 V y = 1...F, where x^ = wh (12)
H
so that ^2 X)Y - wh = 0.
Theorem 2 The economy
L={X = Rl+,s = 1...5,u^ € # x 5 , Vh : X -> R, h = 1...
satisfying assumptions 1 — 10 has an equilibrium
{Y*,Jy*,xh*,0h*iPm fory = l...Y*,h = 1...
with full insurance against price risks, and yielding a Pareto efficient allocation.
Proof: The proof proceeds by constructing the equilibria of a sequence of auxiliary
economies, which are subsequently discarded.
Consider the Walrasian economy {wh,uh : X —> R,h = 1...H} defined in Section
2, where the households are only concerned about the uncertainty denned by the
Savage states s = 1...5. Call this economy E\. The set of Walrasian equilibria of E\ is
denoted J1* = {1...J1*}, this set will define the first layer of price uncertainty of our
19
economy L, y = 1. By definition, each of the J1* equilibria of E\ consists of a price
vector p* £ RSxl and, for each h a consumption vector Xj* £ RSxl, for j 1 = 1... J1*.
We shall now define a second economy £"2 having the same H households, / com-
modities and S Savage states as E\. We shall assign Ei a different commodity space
and, for each h, different endowments and different utilities. The commodity space of
E2 has J1* new states of uncertainty and therefore the commodity space is RlxSxJl\
In E2 household h's endowment is the vector defined by the J1* equilibria of E\ side
by side , i.e. by the vector (zj*...z^) € RlxSxJl\ where xfi € RlxS. Household h's
utility of consumption in E2 is as in (1) the expected utility of consumption over the
J1* states, Vh : Rl*sxJl* _• .ft, all states evaluated with the same probability:
t = l
Assume now that the second economy E2 has J2* Walrasian equilibria. Then each
of the J2* Walrasian equilibria of E2 consists of a price vector p*p G RSxlxJ1* and, for
each h, a consumption vector x$ € RSxlxJlm for j 2 = I...J2*. The set J2* = {1...J2*}
of Walrasian equilibria of the economy E2 will define layer y = 2 uncertainty of our
economy L.
E2 has new states of uncertainty over and above those of E\, indeed J]* of them,
but it also has all instruments needed to hedge this uncertainty, because, by construc-
tion, in E2 households have markets contingent on the J1* states of price uncertainty.
The financial instruments corresponding to these contingent trades correspond to the
portfolios of 1—assets defined in 5.3, namely vectors describing wealth transfers be-
tween the J1* price-uncertainty states of economy Ei, (^...^ji*), with J2i=i^i = 0*
Since all assets needed to hedge the J1* states of price uncertainty are available in £72i
at an equilibrium household h will achieve state independent consumption over the
J1* states. This is because in each of these J1* states the total endowment w = J2h wli
of the economy i?2 is the same, and every h has the same probability over the J1*
states. Since each household achieves state independent consumption over the J1*
states of price uncertainty, this means that at an equilibrium of E2 the consumption
vector x*p G RSxlxJ1*oi the h household consists of S x / coordinates repeated J1*
times. Clearly, this vector is then properly identified by 5 x / coordinates only, i.e.
x*p £ RSxl. The corresponding prices are p>2* € RlxS.
Each household in E2 shifts wealth across the J1* states to achieve the same
consumption level at each, a shift represented by the vector with J1* coordinates. At
any market clearing equilibrium j 2 of E2 this shift in wealth is, by definition, equal to a
vector of differences between the value of the endowments evaluated at the equilibrium
price Pj2 in state j 2 , namely pJ2.;rf*, and the value of the equilibrium consumption at
the same prices, namely p*p.x^* for each j 1 = 1...J1*. By definition of an equilibrium,
each household's consumption must be within his/her budget constraint, so that
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Vfc = 1...JJ,
jf'-tp = E (P2*-***) a t e a c h i2 = 1- J 2*»
so that Vj2 = 1...J2*
S /•(*£ - 4D = 0. (13)
Now define [^ /l2] as the following collection of J2* vectors in Rjl* :
(P2*.(x^ - *?•)... p2*.(x^ - arj?)) G i*j1', for j 2 = 1...J2-}
Then by (13), [6h2] defines a layer 2 portfolio of 1—assets, since for each j2 =
1...J2*
£ ^ =0,
which is the condition required in the definition of a layer 2 portfolio, Subsection 5.3.
Recall that in the economy E2 there are many different ways to achieve the equal-
ization of consumption across the J1* equilibria; there are precisely J2* ways to do
so, one for each of the equilibria of E2. Corresponding to these are the J2* portfolios
of level 1 assets making the layer 2 portfolio [9h2\ in (14). Since there are J2* ways
to achieve this equalization of consumption across all J1* states of uncertainty, each
yielding a different market clearing price or state in layer 2, E2 introduces J2* new
states of price uncertainty which will define our second layer y = 2. To hedge these
new states, consider a new economy JE73, which is defined exactly the same as £2 but
for its commodity space which is now equal to RlxSxJ^* to account for the fact that
there are now J2* new states of uncertainty. Repeating the same argument we build
inductively a sequence of economies {Ey}, each economy Ey having the endowments
provided by the set of Jy~u equilibria of Ey-\, each economy Ey hedging the price
risks of the former, Ey-\, and each household h in Ey achieving state independent
consumption over the states Jy~u. This sequence of economies {^y} coincides with
the sequence defined in Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2].
To summarize: the economy Ey has an consumption set j#xS*J9~lm t household
h has as initial endowment her/his allocation at the Jy~lm equilibria, namely the
vector (x!j*...x)%u) G i^ *5*-7*""1*, where a$l, € RlxS is the state-independent j y ~ l -
th equilibrium allocation of household h at the economy Ey-\. Household h's utility
of consumption in Ey is the expected utility of consumption over the Jy~u states,
yh . filxSxJy- • __^ Q
 ajj stat;es evaluated with the same probability:
1 = 1
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If the economy Ey has Jy* Walrasian equilibria, then each of the Jy* Walrasian
equilibria of Ey consists of a price vector pjy G RSxlxJy" * and, for each h, a consump-
tion vector *J; € RSxlxJW"lm for j y = 1...JV. The set Jy* = {1...J**} of Walrasian
equilibria of the economy Ey shall define the y — th layer of uncertainty of our economy
L. Since all assets needed to hedge the Jy~u states of price uncertainty are available,
at each of the Jy~l* states of price uncertainty in Ey, households are fully insured
against all the risk implicit in the Jy~u states. This means that at an equilibrium
of Ey the consumption vector xfi G RSxlxJy~1*oi the h household consists of S x /
coordinates repeated Jy~u times. Clearly, this vector is then properly identified by
5 x / coordinates only, i.e. x^y € RSxl and the price p*2* £ RSxl.
Each household in Ey shifts wealth across the Jy~u states to achieve the same
consumption level at each, a shift represented by the vector with Jy~u coordinates.
At any market clearing equilibrium j y of Ey this shift in wealth is, by definition,
equal to a vector of differences between the value of the endowments evaluated at the
equilibrium price p*-y in state j y , namely pjv.a^jLi, for j y ~ l = l...Jy~1*, and the value
of the equilibrium consumption at the same prices, namely p'-y.xfi. By definition of an
equilibrium, each household's consumption must be within his/her budget constraint,
so that V/i = 1...H, and
so that Vjy = l...Jy*
-
xp-i) = 0 at each jy = l..Jy\ (15)
jy=i
E ^(4* ~ 4-) =0- (16)
Now define [0ky] as the following Jy* vectors in RJy~lm :
[0*] = (9?*" ...9$") =
(j?:(xf; - *f)... p»*\(*£ - *};.)) e RJ"-U, for y» = i..j»}
Then by (16) [0hy] defines a layer y portfolio of (y — 1)—assets, since for each
j y = l...Jy*
*£ 0^ = 0, (18)
i=l
which is the condition required in the definition of a layer y portfolio in Subsection
5.3.
Under the regularity assumption 2, Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal [2] prove that
this process leads in a finite number of steps to an economy Ey* having a unique,
and Pareto efficient, Walrasian equilibrium, in other words
that s£ = xfr \/jY*,j'Y* = l...JY\ (19)
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The existence of an equilibrium for the economy L can now be established. The
uncertainty structure is defined by Y* layers indexed by y = 1...Y*, with JY* states
of uncertainty in each layer indicated j y = l...Jy*. Give each j y a probability 7rjy =
1/Jy*. For y = 1...Y* , consider p^y € RlxS be the j * equilibrium price vector of the
economy Ey, j y = l...Jy*. Define
f = (pji,»., Pjv. W..ji . . .^=i. . . j>r. € fl*x'*5 (20)
to be a price system for L. For each A = 1...H and y = 1...Y*, consider x^, the
consumption vector of household h in the j y equilibrium of the economy Ey, j y =
1... Jv*. Then define the ex-ante plan xh* of the h household in economy L by
«*• = ((xjr - «»),..., (*$:„ - «Jr) ) i . - i . j . . . j y - , . j r . e i?* x ! x S . (21)
Finally let [^ fcy] be defined as in (17), and define household h's ex-ante portfolio 0hm
in the economy L to be:
0i» = ([ehu]...[0hY*]). (22)
It remains now to check that {Y*,Jy*,p*,xh*,0h*,h = I...H, y = 1...Y*} is an equi-
librium of L.
First we check that \/h = I...H, xh* is in B(p\0hm) as defined in (8) : this follows
from (21),(22)and (16)(17)(18).
Condition (12) for an equilibrium follows from the fact that for each y = 1...Y*
each market contingent on the J*"1 states of uncertainty of the economy Ey~i must
clear at each Walrasian equilibrium j y of the economy Ey; condition (11) follows
directly from (12). Finally we check that Uh is maximized at xh* given xh'm, Vhr ^ h.
For this, first recall that x1^ = x**, VjYJY' = l...Jy* by (19), so that
Uh(xh*) = Vh{xhfY).
Finally, note that the allocation {£jy G RlxS,h = 1...H} is Pareto efficient because
it is the Walrasian equilibrium of the economy Ey*. This completes the proof. •
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